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ABSTRACT
Schopenhauer’s argument against suicide has served as a punching bag for
many modern-day commentators. Dale Jacquette, Sandra Shapshay, and
David Hamlyn all argue that the premises of this argument or its conclusion
are inconsistent with Schopenhauer’s wider metaphysical and ethical project.
This paper defends Schopenhauer from these charges. Along the way, it
examines the relations between suicide, death by voluntary starvation,
negation of the will, compassion, and Schopenhauer’s critiques of cynicism
and stoicism. The paper concludes that there may be gaps in Schopenhauer’s
system, but not where the aforementioned commentators tried to locate them.
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1. Introduction
Schopenhauer’s argument against suicide has served as a punching bag for
many modern-day commentators. It is often claimed that its premises or con-
clusion are inconsistent with Schopenhauer’s wider metaphysical and ethical
project.
For instance, Dale Jacquette (“Schopenhauer on Death”; “The Ethics of
Suicide”; The Philosophy of Schopenhauer) argues that even if Schopenhauer
succeeds in showing that suicide is often objectionable, he has no e!ective
objection to ‘philosophically enlightened suicide’. This claim is endorsed by
Sandra Shapshay (“Review”) and supplemented by the worry that Schopen-
hauer has no good answer to the question ‘why not annihilate all sentient
creatures?’. In Reconstructing Schopenhauer’s Ethics, Shapshay also argues
that there is a tension between the Schopenhauerian ideals of resignation
and compassion, which puts some pressure on the argument against
suicide. A further blow comes from David Hamlyn (Schopenhauer) who
suggests that Schopenhauer’s argument utilizes an unsupported premise
that something better can be achieved by abstaining from suicide.
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This article defends Schopenhauer’s argument against suicide from these
charges. The "rst part develops a novel reading of this argument. Section 2
explains the core tenets of Schopenhauer’s system relevant to the present dis-
cussion. Section 3 reconstructs the argument against suicide. Section 4
suggests that the connections between this argument and Schopenhauer’s
critiques of stoicism provide further support for the presented interpretation.
Section 5 discusses how to make sense of the apparent desirability of death by
voluntary starvation.
The second part, which spans sections 6 through 9, addresses a range of
interpretative questions which arise for this reading and the aforementioned
challenges to the soundness of Schopenhauer’s argument.
The paper concludes that there may be gaps in Schopenhauer’s system,
but not where the aforementioned commentators tried to locate them.
2. Preliminaries
Before we get to the details of Schopenhauer’s argument against suicide, it is
important to outline the core elements of his philosophical system.
Schopenhauer follows Kant in distinguishing between two aspects of the
world: the thing in itself and representation. The objects of our experience
belong to the latter aspect and are ordered by space and time, and by
relations of cause and e!ect.
Unlike Kant, however, Schopenhauer thinks that the thing in itself is know-
able and identi"es it with the will.1 He sees it as something that at the funda-
mental level lacks any end or purpose:
Regarded simply in itself, the will is just a blind and inexorable impulse, devoid
of cognition.
(WWR I, §54, 301)2
At the level of representation, however, “what the will wills is always life”
(WWR I, §54, 301). More precisely, the will aims at the well-being of the indi-
vidual in which it is objecti"ed and at the preservation of the species. For this
reason, Schopenhauer frequently refers to the will at the level of represen-
tation as the will to life.
This metaphysical system gives rise to a famously pessimistic perspective
about the lot of humanity. Since the will pervades the entire world as its
1This standard reading has been challenged. For instance, Young (“Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Death”)
argues that, at least late in his life, Schopenhauer maintained that the thing in itself is unknowable
and the will is merely the penultimate reality. See also Neeley (“Schopenhauer and the Limits”), De
Cian and Segala (“What is Will?”), Jacquette (“Schopenhauer’s Proof”), Wicks (Schopenhauer), and Shap-
shay (“Poetic Intuition”; Reconstructing Schopenhauer’s Ethics).
2All page references to The World as Will and Representation, Vol. 1 and both volumes of Parerga and Para-
lipomena are to the Cambridge edition translated by Christopher Janaway and colleagues. All page refer-
ences to the second volume of WWR are to the E. F. J. Payne edition.
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essence, to live is to perpetually develop new desires and urges. But, Schopen-
hauer thinks, striving to satisfy our desires is painful. And even if we manage
to satisfy them, we either enter the painful state of boredom, or else develop
new desires and start the cycle anew. Schopenhauer illustrates this in a mem-
orable quote:
Whether we hunt or we #ee, whether we fear harm or chase pleasure, it is fun-
damentally all the same: concern for the constant demands of the will, whatever
form they take, continuously "lls consciousness and keeps it in motion: but
without peace, there can be no true well-being. So the subject of willing
remains on the revolving wheel of Ixion, keeps drawing water from the sieve
of Danaids, is the eternally yearning Tantalus.
(WWR I, §38, 220)
It does not matter what our objects of desire are and how e$cient we are at
"nding ways of ful"lling them; our life is bound to be "lled with su!ering.3
Moreover, in the pursuit of our desires, we inevitably in#ict su!ering on one
another:
So the will to life constantly lives and feeds o! itself in its di!erent forms up to
the human race which overpowers all others… this is the same human race in
which this struggle, this self-rupturing of the will, reveals itself with the most ter-
rible clarity and man is a wolf to man.
(WWR I, §27, 172)
Schopenhauer identi"es two ways of escaping this cycle of willing and
su!ering. A partial and temporary solution is o!ered by aesthetic contempla-
tion. Describing the artist in the "nal paragraph of Book 3, Schopenhauer
writes:
For him that pure, true and profound cognition of the essence of the world
becomes a goal in itself: he comes to a stop there. Hence, this cognition…
redeems him from life, not forever but only momentarily.
(WWR I, §52, 295)
A permanent solution to the problem of willing is identi"ed by Schopenhauer
in the negation (Verneinung) of the will to life which culminates in the state of
will-lessness (Willenslosigkeit). We will examine this phenomenon in great
detail in subsequent sections. For now, it su$ces to say that in that state
the individual no longer wills in the ordinary, individualistic way.
3. The argument against suicide
Schopenhauer directly addresses suicide only in two short sections, §69 of
WWR I and Chapter 13 of PP II, but various remarks about it can be found
3For a critical discussion of Schopenhauer’s pessimism, see Atwell (Schopenhauer), Janaway (“Schopen-
hauer’s Pessimism), and Shapshay (Reconstructing Schopenhauer’s Ethics).
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throughout the corpus of his work. First-time readers often "nd it surprising
that, having characterized existence as a nightmare, Schopenhauer goes on
to oppose suicide. This section reconstructs his case for this conclusion.
In PP II, Schopenhauer summarizes his argument in the following way:
I illustrated the only relevant moral reason against suicide in my main work, vol.
1, §69. It lies in the fact that suicide is counter to achieving the highest moral
goal insofar as it substitutes a merely illusory redemption from this world of
misery for the real one.
(PP II, §157, 329)
In a nutshell: suicide is objectionable because it prevents one from attaining
salvation in the state of will-lessness, which is superior to the outcome of
suicide. It will be helpful to break this argument into four claims and
examine each of them in detail:
(1) Suicide does not lead to salvation.
(2) Suicide prevents one from attaining salvation.
(3) Salvation is attainable via some alternative path.
(4) Salvation is superior to the outcome of death.
Consider the "rst claim. Schopenhauer thinks that suicide does not lead to
salvation because (i) salvation requires the negation of the will, and (ii) suicide
does not involve the negation of the will.
Regarding (i), let’s just note for now that Schopenhauer writes that:
true salvation, redemption from life and su!ering, is unthinkable without the
complete negation of the will.
(WWR I, §69, 424)
What salvation amounts to and how the negation of the will makes it possible
are issues that merit longer discussions and we will return to them later.
In support of (ii) Schopenhauer argues that genuine negation of the will
involves detesting the essential feature of life, not merely the contingent
ones. As he sees it, the phenomenology of suicide is very di!erent:
The person who commits suicide wills life, and is only unsatis"ed with the con-
ditions under which life has been given to him.
(WWR I, §69, 425)
In fact, Schopenhauer suggests, suicide is the opposite of the negation of the
will: it is “a strong a$rmation of the will” (WWR I, §69, 425). He explains that in
certain circumstances the will “reaches the decision” to push an individual to
commit suicide because it “"nds itself so totally constrained in this particular
appearance that it cannot develop its strivings” (WWR I, §69, 426). Because the
will is una!ected by the death of any particular individual, the act of suicide
can be seen as the will’s attempt to free itself from that individual. The
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person who commits suicide is deceived that they negate the will, but end up
a$rming it.
The second claim is that suicide prevents one from attaining salvation. This
is so in two ways. First, trivially, if one commits suicide, they lose the opportu-
nity to negate the will and hence the possibility of salvation. Second, more
substantially, according to Schopenhauer the very su!ering that motivated
one to commit suicide, if endured, could have led to the negation of the
will and salvation. He o!ers a powerful analogy here:
someone who commits suicide is a like a sick person who, having started under-
going operation that could cure him completely, does not allow it to be com-
pleted and would rather stay sick.
(WWR I, §69, 427)
To appreciate this point fully, we must examine Schopenhauer’s account of
the ways in which the negation of the will can originate. In §68 ofWWR I, Scho-
penhauer explains that the negation of the will requires attainment of a high
degree of insight into the essence of the world. He writes:
if this seeing through the principium individuationis, this immediate cognition of
the identity of the will in all of its appearances, is present at a high degree of
clarity, then it will at once show an even greater in#uence on the will.
(WWR I, §68, 405)
He goes on to describe in some detail the content of this cognition. For
instance, a person who attained it “no longer makes the egoistic distinc-
tion between his person and that of others” and “no longer bears in
mind the changing well-being and woe of his own person” (WWR I, §68,
405). But these are just implications, as it were, of the more fundamental
thought that at the core the world is will and that all living beings are
bound to su!er.
As Schopenhauer explains, this insight can be achieved in two ways:
The di!erence that we have presented by means of two paths is whether this
recognition is called into existence by su!ering that is merely and purely cog-
nized, and which is freely approached by our seeing through the principium indi-
viduationis, or whether, on the other hand, recognition comes from one’s own
immediate feeling of su!ering.
(WWR I, §68, 424)
In other words, the insight that makes negation of the will possible can orig-
inate in intellectual understanding – either intuitive or abstract – or (more
commonly) in one’s own intense su!ering. We can thus see that when Scho-
penhauer compares someone who commits suicide to a sick person who
interrupts the operation that could cure them, his point is that the same
immediately felt su!ering leads to suicide in the unfortunate case, and to
the negation of the will in the fortunate one.
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The third key claim is that salvation is attainable via some alternative path.
This step is important because even if Schopenhauer succeeds in showing
that suicide does not lead to salvation and impedes the process that might
have led to it, he must also demonstrate that salvation is attainable. If it
were not, then suicide would be better than continuing to live and su!er.
He writes that through the negation of the will:
A human being achieves the state of voluntary renunciation, resignation, true
composure, and complete will-lessness.
(WWR I, §68, 406)
More precisely, the path to salvation leads through asceticism, chastity, inten-
tional poverty, welcoming su!ering in#icted by others, and self-morti"cation,
which are all manifestations of the negation of the will. And it is that state of
complete will-lessness which Schopenhauer identi"es with salvation.
The fourth main claim is that salvation is superior to whatever is achieved
through suicide, death, or continuing to live and su!er. And, indeed, Schopen-
hauer describes the state of will-lessness in the following terms:
Rather, it is an imperturbable peace, a profound calm and inner serenity; and
when we behold this person with our eyes or in our imagination, we cannot
help feeling the greatest longing, since we acknowledge that this alone is in
the right and in!nitely superior to everything else, and our better spirit calls to
us the great ‘Dare to know’.
(WWR I, §68, 417; emphasis added)
That said, like some earlier questions regarding the negation of the will, the issue
of whether Schopenhauer is justi"ed in holding that salvation is superior to the
outcome of suicide merits a much longer discussion and needs to be postponed.
These gaps notwithstanding, it appears that Schopenhauer has a clear
argument against suicide that is securely embedded in his wider metaphysical
and ethical framework. This makes the accusations of inconsistency men-
tioned at the beginning of this paper all the more intriguing. We turn to
them in section 6. Before that, however, it is important to consider further evi-
dence that this is the correct interpretation and to get clearer on what Scho-
penhauer is actually opposing. This is what the next two sections set out to do.
4. Critiques of stoicism
The presented interpretation "nds further support in the fact that Schopenhauer’s
critiques of stoicism are closely connected to his argument against suicide.
According to Schopenhauer, the primary concern of ethics in the ancient
world was how to attain the greatest possible happiness. The Cynics, he writes:
started from the insight that the motions in which the will is put by the objects
that stimulate and stir it, and the laborious and often frustrated e!orts to attain
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them, or the fear of losing them when they are attained, and "nally also the loss
itself, produce far greater pains and sorrows than the want of all these objects
ever can.
(WWR II, Ch. 16, 152)
This proto-Schopenhauerian insight led them to the conclusion that, instead
of directly pursing happiness, one should aim to minimize su!ering by living a
life of “greatest possible privation” (WWR II, Ch. 16, 152). The Stoics, as Scho-
penhauer sees them, turned that into an attitude of indi!erence:
They were of the opinion that actual dispensing with everything that can be dis-
carded is not required, but that it is su$cient for us constantly to regard posses-
sion and enjoyment as dispensable, and as held in the hand of chance; for then
the actual privation, should it eventually occur, would not be unexpected, nor
would it be a burden.
(WWR II, Ch. 16, 155)
Despite the similarity in terms of insight and attitude between the Stoics and
the ascetics whom he describes in laudatory terms, Schopenhauer is critical of
stoicism. In Chapter 14 of PP II, Schopenhauer argues that it cannot o!er a
remedy to the omnipresence of su!ering:
Whoever realizes through such considerations how necessary distress and
su!ering usually are for our salvation will recognize that we should envy
others not so much for their fortune but for their misfortune. For the same
reason stoicism of disposition, which de"es fates, is of course also a good
armour against the su!ering of life and useful in order to better endure the
present, but it stands in the way of true salvation because it hardens the heart.
(PP II, §170, 340–1; emphasis added)
The thought here appears to be that the su!ering which the Stoics seek to
avoid could lead one to the negation of the will and salvation. To use Scho-
penhauer’s earlier illustration, the Stoic is like a sick person who does not
allow a painful operation that could cure them to be completed. And thus,
just like suicide prevents one from attaining salvation, so does genuine stoi-
cism of disposition.
Schopenhauer’s further critique of stoicism in §16 ofWWR I is also connected
to his thoughts on suicide. He thinks that even perfecting the stoic disposition is
not going to be su$cient to eliminate all su!ering from one’s life. Consequently,
“it is rather completely contradictory to want to live without su!ering” (WWR I,
§16, 117). That is, if their goal really is to minimize su!ering, then:
the Stoics are forced to include in their guide for a blessed life… recommen-
dation for suicide in the case of excessive and incurable bodily su!ering incap-
able of being philosophized away.
(WWR I, §16, 117)
But, as we have seen, Schopenhauer holds that the outcome of suicide is
inferior to the negation of the will that could arise otherwise.
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These connections and similarities provide further evidence for the accuracy
of the reading of Schopenhauer’s argument against suicide presented earlier.
5. Death by voluntary starvation
It is also important to get clearer on what Schopenhauer is actually opposing.
One might think that Schopenhauer does not oppose suicide altogether, but
only some kinds of it. This is because he appears to exempt “death by volun-
tary starvation that emerges at the highest levels of asceticism” (WWR I, §69,
428) from the import of his argument. It is thus worth asking what’s special
about this kind of death.
An initial thought might be that it is the method that makes death by volun-
tary starvation stand out. Perhaps it matters how long it takes for one to die
and how painful it is. Starvation clearly outclasses in these respects more
common methods of suicide such as hanging oneself or overdosing medi-
cations. However, duration and painfulness cannot be what sets death by
voluntary starvation apart because there are conceivable methods of
suicide that beat starvation in terms of both the duration and the intensity
of su!ering.
A further thought might be that death by voluntary starvation di!ers from
other kinds of suicide because death is unwilled. This interpretation "nds some
support in Schopenhauer’s suggestion that death by voluntary starvation is not
the result of the ascetic’s will to die, but of her indi!erence to life and death:
Far from stemming from the will to life, in this kind of suicide an ascetic of this
type stops living simply because he has stopped willing altogether.
(WWR I, §69, 428)
However, that death is unintended cannot be the bottom of things. After all,
dying in a car accident or drowning are also often unwilled. These cases seem
radically di!erent from death by voluntary starvation.
Finally, one might think that what ultimately matters is in what state death
occurs. This is the most promising reading of Schopenhauer’s view. Describing
a genuine ascetic, he writes that:
it is not really conceivable that he would die in any other way than starvation…
because the intention of shortening misery would actually involve a degree of
a$rmation of the will.
(WWR I, §69, 428)
Thus, Schopenhauer thinks that only death by voluntary starvation could
occur in the state of will-lessness. This is what separates it from the
common kinds of suicide.
Two further comments about this reading are in order. First, it is worth
noting that while Schopenhauer seems right to claim that one could not
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hang oneself in the state of will-lessness, he seems to overlook the possibility
of other kinds of death occurring in that state. For we can easily think of a case
in which someone in the state of will-lessness accidentally cuts herself and
abstains from stopping the bleeding or else a case in which they are
crushed under a collapsing building whose foundations were damaged by
an earthquake. And, taking on board everything that Schopenhauer says
about the negation of the will, there is intuitively nothing tragic about
these sorts of death in the state of will-lessness as opposed to dying as a
result of starvation minutes later. Thus, if it matters just in what state death
occurs, Schopenhauer would welcome these other kinds of death in the
state of will-lessness.
Second, one might wonder whether death by voluntary starvation should
really be thought of as a kind of suicide within Schopenhauer’s system. He cer-
tainly refers to it as “a form of suicide” and as “this kind of suicide” (WWR I, §69,
428). But there are reasons not to classify it as such.
For one thing, when introducing death by voluntary starvation, Schopen-
hauer also says that it is “completely di!erent from the usual kind [of
suicide]” and that it “might still not be well enough established” (WWR I,
§69, 428). And he provides a long list of real-world examples of this phenom-
enon. This suggests that he is conscious of the fact that he is speaking of
something that is not well-known. He might be thinking that his audience
is likely to classify this death as a kind of suicide and is trying to accommodate
these intuitions.
For another, when Schopenhauer "rst describes suicide, he says that it is a
“phenomenon of a strong a$rmation of will” (WWR I, §69, 425). Death by
voluntary starvation, however, does not appear to be willed in any relevant
sense. Instead, it seems to be a mere by-product of being in the state of
will-lessness.
If this is right, then it emerges that Schopenhauer opposes all forms of
suicide. Death by voluntary starvation is not objectionable because it is not
a kind of suicide and does not stand in the way of salvation. But, of course,
this is only a matter of classi"cation; it does not a!ect the extension of Scho-
penhauer’s view.
6. Philosophically enlightened suicide
With the preceding in place, we are "nally in a position to evaluate objec-
tions to Schopenhauer’s argument against suicide raised by contemporary
commentators. This discussion will further illuminate Schopenhauer’s
treatment of suicide and enhance our understanding of his ethical and
metaphysical project.
One stage-setting assumption before we begin. Since our primary concern
is with the consistency of Schopenhauer’s project, Sections 6–8 take two
BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 9
claims from Section 3 for granted: (i) that the negation of the will is necessary
for salvation, and (ii) that salvation in the state of will-lessness is superior to
the outcome of ordinary death and suicide. Section 9 evaluates these
assumptions.
Dale Jacquette raises a number of objections to Schopenhauer’s argument
against suicide. His central worry is this:
Why according to Schopenhauer should a person not do so [commit suicide]
while enjoying good health, the love of family and friends, productive activity,
and all of life’s pleasures, precisely in order to ful"l life’s purpose by ending it
for philosophical reasons immediately upon achieving realisation of the appear-
ance-reality distinction?
(“The Ethics of Suicide”, 54; The Philosophy of Schopenhauer, 142)
Jacquette’s point here is that Schopenhauer has no e!ective argument
against what might be called ‘philosophically enlightened suicide’. It has
the following features: (i) the subject has recognized that the will is the
essence of the world, (ii) the subject is not trying to free herself from the con-
tingencies of life, and (iii) the subject is not deluded that she negates the will
as the thing in itself. In these circumstances, Jacquette suggests, the subject
could “simply will to end [their] life” (The Philosophy of Schopenhauer, 139).
There are two main problems with Jacquette’s objection. The "rst is that a
person who meets the above conditions would not choose to commit suicide.
On Schopenhauer’s account, it would be psychologically impossible for them
to do so. For suppose that an individual has recognized that the will is the
essence of the world. If this person is also ‘enjoying all of life’s pleasures’,
then this recognition must have had its origin in intellectual understanding
rather than personally felt su!ering. Now, Schopenhauer is adamant that:
the recognition of the whole, of the essence of things in themselves such as we
have described becomes the tranquilizer [Quietiv] of all and every willing.
(WWR I, §68, 406)
There are two ways to interpret this thought. One, that the recognition of the
essence of the world is su$cient to make one negate the will and enter the
state of will-lessness. But, in this state, one is meant to cease willing and be
indi!erent towards life and death. This rules out the possibility of willing to
end one’s life.
Two, even if the recognition of the essence of the world is not su$cient to
make one enter the state of will-lessness, it would presumably involve aware-
ness that salvation is possible through the negation of the will. It would there-
fore prompt the individual to abstain from committing suicide and to step on
the path of ascetic renunciation instead.4
4Section 9 of this paper discusses further textual support for this thought and explains in more detail how
attaining su!cient insight into the essence of the world leads to a transformation in the individual.
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If, on the other hand, one commits suicide, this serves as excellent evidence
that this person did not fully grasp the nature of reality. This reminiscent of
Schopenhauer’s critique of cynicism from Chapter 16 of WWR II. There, he
notes that unlike the ascetics, the Cynics are not typically characterized by
a compassionate attitude towards other people. This indicates that the
insight which Cynics have into the essence of the world is severely limited,
for they fail to recognize that the boundaries between them and other
people are merely illusory.
The second problem with Jacquette’s objection is related. Irrespectively of
whether it would be psychologically possible for someone who attained the
highest degree of insight to commit suicide, it is clear that on Schopenhauer’s
account that person would have no reason to do so. They would have no
objective reason to commit suicide because there is something better to be
achieved in the state of will-lessness. And they would have no subjective
reason to commit suicide because, if they really possessed the highest
degree of insight, they would also recognize that there is something better
to be achieved through salvation.
Of course, we are yet to examine whether Schopenhauer is justi"ed in
claiming that there is something better to be achieved in the state of will-less-
ness. But what matters presently is that, although Schopenhauer never expli-
citly addresses the possibility of philosophically enlightened suicide, his
argument against suicide in general straightforwardly extends to this kind
as well.5
7. The value of su!ering and compassion
Another challenge raised by Jacquette is captured in the following question:
If su!ering sancti"es, and if sancti"cation is a good thing, should it not then be
wrong to avoid, let alone willfully avoid, the vicissitudes of the will to life, no
matter how unpleasant?
(“The Ethics of Suicide”, 54; The Philosophy of Schopenhauer, 143)
Jacquette’s point appears to be that there is a contradiction in Schopen-
hauer’s endorsement of asceticism: su!ering is supposed to sanctify and
Schopenhauer endorses stepping on a path that inevitably ends our su!ering.
As we will see, there is no genuine contradiction here. To begin with, let’s
get clearer on the issue of sancti"cation. Schopenhauer refers to su!ering in
these terms in the following passage:
5A further issue with Jacquette’s argument concerns his characterization of the prospective suicide as
someone who enjoys ‘all of life’s pleasures’. That may be understood as a life that is overall happy. Scho-
penhauer admittedly never considers whether salvation in the state of will-lessness would be better
than continuing or ending such a life. But this is because he is adamant that such existence is impossible;
for su"ering is unavoidable and all pleasure is merely negative. See section 2 of this paper, and WWR,
Ch. 46; PP I, 334; PP II, §172a.
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Because all su!ering is morti"cation and a call to resignation, it has the potential
to be a sanctifying force; this explains why great unhappiness and deep pain
themselves inspire a certain respect.
(WWR I, §68, 423)
Importantly, Schopenhauer sees su!ering as sanctifying only in the sense that
it can lead one to recognize the essence of the world. As we have seen in
section 3, Schopenhauer sees personally felt su!ering as a common path to
such insight. But then su!ering is ‘a good thing’ only instrumentally. Schopen-
hauer’s earlier analogy proves illuminating here: there is nothing "nally desir-
able in a medical operation; it is desirable only in virtue of curing one’s
harmful condition. This reading is further con"rmed by Schopenhauer’s
remarks further in the same section:
He [the su!erer] only becomes awe-inspiring when he lifts his gaze from the par-
ticular to the universal, when he views his own su!ering as a mere example of
the whole and, becoming a genius in the ethical sense, treats it as one case in a
thousand, so that the whole of life, seen essentially as su!ering, brings him to
the point of resignation.
(WWR I, §68, 423; emphasis added)
Indeed, as Christopher Janaway reports, Schopenhauer stresses at one point
that not merely su!ering, but also the moral attitudes and actions he
describes in laudatory terms throughout the fourth book of WWR I, have
merely instrumental, or transcendent, value. In an 1844 letter to his long-
time correspondent, Johann August Becker, Schopenhauer writes:
Now as to what this value of moral action ultimately rests on–… the value that
such actions have for the one who performs them himself is a transcendent
value, inasmuch as it lies in their leading him towards the sole path of salvation,
i.e. deliverance from this world of being born, su!ering and dying… So this con-
tains the really !nal elucidation concerning the value of morality, which value is
not itself something absolutely "nal but rather a step towards it.
(GB, 220; quoted from Janaway, “What’s So Good”, 660)
With this in place, let’s turn to the issue of Schopenhauer’s endorsement of
avoiding su!ering. There are multiple questions here.
First, does Schopenhauer recommend avoiding our su"ering? One might
think that he does because he endorses the negation of the will, which
leads to the state of will-lessness. In this state, one appears to no longer
experience any su!ering. And one is likely to die from voluntary starvation
which permanently prevents su!ering. But there is no contradiction here. It
is consistent to claim that su!ering is instrumentally good (because it has
the potential to bring about salvation) and that only salvation is "nally
good (because it brings an end to su!ering).
Second, one may wonder whether this implies that we should actively seek
out su"ering for ourselves to facilitate the negation of the will. In principle, we
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should. In WWR I, Schopenhauer’s descriptions of the ascetic life that leads to
salvation include not just welcoming su!ering coming your way, abstinence,
and giving away your possessions, but also “self-torture to completely mortify
the will” (WWR I, §68, 415). In the second volume, however, Schopenhauer
quali"es this:
Now since, according to this, poverty, privations, and special su!erings of
many kinds are produced by the most complete exercise of moral virtues, asce-
ticism in the narrowest sense, the giving up of all property, the deliberate
search for the unpleasant and repulsive, self-torture, fasting, the hair
garment, morti"cation of the #esh; all these are rejected by many as super#u-
ous, and perhaps rightly so. Justice itself is the hairy garment that causes its
owner constant hardship, and philanthropy that gives away what is necessary
provides us with constant fasting. For this reason, Buddhism is free from that
strict and excessive asceticism that plays a large part in Brahmanism, and
thus from deliberate self-morti"cation.
(WWR II, Ch. 48, 608)
The thought here appears to be that it is unnecessary to actively seek out
su!ering, because mere renunciation is bound to bring enough hardship
for us to end up negating the will.
The preceding discussion concerns Schopenhauer’s view about our
su!ering. But it is also worth thinking about the place of the su!ering of
others in this system.
In Reconstructing Schopenhauer’s Ethics, Sandra Shapshay makes a strong
case for the claim that Schopenhauer’s ideals of compassion and resignation
are in tension in two ways, one of which is this. On the one hand, Schopen-
hauer claims that personal su!ering has great instrumental value for that
su!erer. Indeed, as we have seen, suicide is objectionable precisely because
it cuts our su!ering short and thus prevents us from attaining salvation. On
the other hand, Schopenhauer frequently praises compassionate action
which aims at alleviating the su!ering of others. In OBM, for instance, Scho-
penhauer celebrates institutional e!orts to end slavery and animal cruelty.
But if compassionate action reduces others’ su!ering, then why isn’t it objec-
tionable like suicide?
This is an important challenge, and one that Schopenhauer does not expli-
citly address. But he seems to have the resources to answer it. To see this, we
need to examine in greater detail the e!ects of compassionate action both on
the su!erer and on the agent.
Consider the su"erer, "rst. Compassionate action certainly aims at alleviat-
ing another’s su!ering. Schopenhauer acknowledges that it can also be
e!ective in reducing su!ering, at least in the short term. For example, he
writes that compassion “manifests a decided and truly miraculous e!ective-
ness, daily prevents many a wrong and calls into being many a good deed”
(OBM, 223). However, there are reasons to think that Schopenhauer sees it
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as largely inconsequential in the long term. This reading "nds support in a
series of remarks that Schopenhauer makes when he elaborates on the idea
of unavoidability of pain:
The perpetual e!orts to banish su!ering do nothing more than alter its form.
This is originally lack, need, worries over how to sustain life. If (and this is extre-
mely di$cult) we are successful in driving out pain in this form, then it immedi-
ately appears in a thousand others, varying, according to age and circumstances,
as sex drive, passionate love, envy, jealousy, hatred, anxiety, ambition, greed,
illness, etc., etc. If it ultimately cannot "nd any other form in which to appear,
then it comes in the sad grey garments of satiety and boredom, and we then
try hard to fend it o!. Even if we "nally succeed in driving these away, it can
hardly be done without letting the pain back in one of its previous forms and
so beginning the dance all over again.
(WWR I, §57, 341)
Importantly, his claim is not just that the presence of su!ering in one’s life is
unavoidable but also that its total amount is largely predetermined:
This would mean that a person’s su!ering or well-being would not be deter-
mined externally at all, but instead it would be a function of that pre-set
amount or arrangement. It certainly might increase or decrease at di!erent
times due to physical constitution, but overall it would remain the same.
(WWR I, §57, 342)
The picture that emerges from these considerations is that compassionate
action has no lasting in#uence on the amount of su!ering endured by its
intended bene"ciary. And so, it does not have the e!ect of moving the
su!erer further away from salvation.6 If that’s right, then the "rst tension
identi"ed by Shapshay is resolved.
But one might wonder at this point whether this resolution does not come
at the price of creating an inconsistency elsewhere. For if compassion has little
or no bene"t for the su!erer, why is it praised by Schopenhauer?
The answer is that compassion is valuable primarily in virtue of its e!ect on
the agent. Schopenhauer writes that the genuinely compassionate person:
must also regard the endless su!ering of all living things as his own, and take
upon himself the pain of the whole world. No su!ering is foreign to him. All
the miseries of others that he sees and is so rarely in a position to alleviate, all
these a"ect his spirit as if they were his own.
(WWR I, §68, 405; emphasis added)
The e!ect in question is, of course, that “the will begins turning away from life”
(WWR I, §68, 406). Schopenhauer’s point is that taking a genuinely compassio-
nate stance delivers that "nal push towards salvation by crushing the agent
6Schopenhauer makes similar remarks in other contexts. For instance, in §62 of WWR I, he suggests that
even if the institution of the state miraculously managed to prevent people from harming one another,
the void would be quickly #lled by other forms of su"ering.
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with the amount of su!ering that they could never experience on their own.7
This reading is further con"rmed by Schopenhauer’s remarks in WWR II:
[the compassionate person] takes over also the su!erings that originally fall to
the lot of others; he therefore appropriates to himself a greater share of these
than would come to him as an individual in the ordinary course of things.
(WWR II, Ch. 48, 606)
It is in virtue of this role that compassion is valuable, and not because of the
e!ect it has on its intended bene"ciaries.8
These considerations also o!er a way of addressing the second inconsis-
tency that Shapshay attributes to Schopenhauer. The "rst one, recall, was
that compassionate action seems to undermine others’ renunciation. The
second one is that our renunciation seems to undermine the possibility of
realizing the ideal of compassion captured by the principle “Harm no one;
rather help everyone to the extent that you can” (OBM, 140). This is
because the truly resigned person no longer actively helps others by alleviat-
ing their su!ering.
However, this tension is only apparent. First, as suggested above, the value
of compassion lies primarily in its e!ect on the agent. Once the state of will-
lessness is attained, compassionate action has no further role to play. Thus, it
matters little that we can no longer actively helps others by alleviating
their su!ering.
Second, to the extent that helping others is important also in virtue of its
e!ect on them, the truly resigned person does indeed help others in an impor-
tant way. This does not take the form of alleviating their su!ering (which, as
we have seen, would be largely futile anyway). Instead, this help takes the
form of serving as a source of knowledge and as a role model for those
who are still within the grip of principium individuationis. This reading "nds
textual support in WWR I:
the greatest, most important and most signi!cant appearance that the world can
show us is not someone who conquers the world, but rather someone who over-
comes it… Thus, as badly written as these biographies usually are, even though
they are mixed with superstition and nonsense, the signi"cance of the material
makes these descriptions incomparably more instructive and important for the
philosopher than even Plutarch and Livy.
(WWR I, §68, 412–3; emphasis added)
7It is worth noting that some of Schopenhauer’s discussions of compassion have a more optimistic tone.
For instance, earlier in WWR I, he writes that engaging in acts of compassion can “make the heart feel
larger” and “lend our mood certain cheerfulness” (§66, 400-1). This might be taken to imply that the
value of compassion is also eudaimonistic, and thus anti-resignationist. However, even if that’s right,
Schopenhauer’s later remarks (such as those quoted above) strongly suggest that taking a compassio-
nate stance towards the world brings upon us disproportionately more su"ering than joy.
8Likewise, malicious action which aims to in$ict su"ering on others is primarily objectionable not because
of its e"ect on another, but because it reinforces the agent’s attachment to egoistic distinctions and
moves them further away from salvation.
BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 15
and
when we behold this person with our eyes or in our imagination, we cannot help
feeling the greatest longing, since we acknowledge that this alone is in the right
and in"nitely superior to everything else, and our better spirit calls to us the
great ‘Dare to know’.
(WWR I, §68, 417)
In other terms, observing and re#ecting upon the lives of those who negated
the will can bring about a signi"cant transformation in us and prompt us to
step on the path towards the negation of the will. Thus, on Schopenhauer’s
view, short of undermining the injunction to ‘help everyone to the extent
that you can’, ascetic resignation o!ers the most potent way of complying
with it.
Now, Shapshay acknowledges the possibility that “renunciation helps
others as much as one can by modeling the attitude that would be best for
them too” (Reconstructing Schopenhauer’s Ethics, 28). But she does not
discuss the two passages quoted above and dismisses this reading fairly
quickly. She writes:
First, non-human animals are incapable of renunciation, and this modeling will
not help them at all; second, sainthood is an exceedingly rare option for human
beings, and so a very tenuous way to ‘help others as much as you can’.
(Reconstructing Schopenhauer’s Ethics, 28–9)
However, as noted above, Schopenhauer sees compassionate actions as
having no lasting in#uence on the amount of su!ering that individuals
endure in their lifetime. Thus, the situation of animals is inescapably
tragic: they cannot be helped anyway. And, however ‘tenuous’ it may be,
serving as a source of knowledge and a role model is the best way of
helping other people.
In sum, there is no genuine inconsistency in Schopenhauer’s treatment of
su!ering, compassion, and the negation of the will. Su!ering and compassion
are merely instruments of achieving salvation in the state of will-lessness.
Compassionate action, in particular, does not undermine our and others’
e!orts to attain it. Thus, it is not objectionable on the same grounds as suicide.
8. An end to all willing?
A further challenge to Schopenhauer’s argument against suicide is articulated
in Shapshay’s review of Jacquette’s book:
I have long been worried, as is Jacquette, that Schopenhauer’s thought (despite
the philosopher’s protestations) has no e!ective answer to the question: why
not suicide? Or even worse, why not annihilate all sentient creatures in the
world as a whole?
(“Review”, 804)
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Let’s examine the possibility of annihilation of all sentient life in more detail.
Schopenhauer does not address this issue, but there are su$cient resources in
his system to explain why it would not be desirable.
First, there are reasons to doubt that the annihilation of all sentient beings
would lead to the annihilation of the will itself. On Schopenhauer’s metaphys-
ical picture, the will pervades the entire physical world, not just sentient
beings. For instance, explaining how we may come to attain the insight
into the essence of the world, Schopenhauer writes:
because it is everywhere one and the same, – just as the "rst light of dawn shares
the same sunlight with the bright rays of noon, – it must be called will here as
well as there, a name signifying the being in itself of every thing in the world
and the sole kernel of every appearance.
(WWR I, §23, 143)
That the will itself would not be annihilated is important. This is because there
would remain the possibility of sentient life re-emerging, and so annihilation of
all sentient life could prove futile. It would be a short-term term remedy at best.
Second, we might think of the annihilation of sentient life as a ‘mass
suicide’. This helps us see that this action would be objectionable for the
same reasons as suicide: namely, it would deprive people of the possibility
of attaining salvation in the state of will-lessness which is better than the
outcome of death and suicide.9
9. The value of salvation
The preceding sections argued that the challenges to Schopenhauer’s argu-
ment against suicide raised by modern-day commentators do not go
through. This discussion depended on the assumption that salvation is
superior to the outcome of death. The possibility of defending this claim
within Schopenhauer’s system may be challenged. Indeed, Hamlyn writes:
Suicide is useless only if in those circumstances there is something better to be
achieved. Schopenhauer of course thinks that there is, in the denial of the will,
but it is the very obscurity that attaches to the question what that state brings
for the person concerned that is di!erent from ordinary death that casts doubt
on the claim that suicide is by comparison useless.
(Schopenhauer, 160)
To "nd an answer to this obscure question, we need to better understand
what is involved in the negation of the will.
9Why not annihilate all non-human animals, though? Schopenhauer emphasises that they lack the
capacity to see through the principium individuationis, and thus the possibility to attain salvation
(WWR I, §70, 431). So, the second objection does not apply and there seems to be no reason not to
kill any particular non-human animal in a respectful and painless way. But the #rst still does apply: Scho-
penhauer would presumably see the attempt to eradicate all non-human animals as bound to be futile
in the long run.
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We have already examined its "rst important feature, namely that it
requires the attainment of a high degree of insight into essence of the
world, either through abstract cognition or through immediately felt su!ering.
The second important feature is how the negation of the will and the state
of will-lessness are brought about in the subject. Schopenhauer sometimes
writes as if this is something that the subject comes to desire and bring on
themselves. For instance he talks about:
adopting a di$cult, penitent way of life and seeking out everything they "nd
unpleasant; anything in order to subdue the will that will always strive anew.
(WWR I, §68, 418)
And hemakes analogous remarks about the transition to the state of pure aes-
thetic contemplation (WWR I, §39, 225–6).
However, Schopenhauer is best understood as claiming that the negation
of the will is something that is brought upon us. Welcoming su!ering or
in#icting it on ourselves is merely a condition of the possibility of a transform-
ation in the individual.10 It is the insight into the essence of the world that is
the e$cient cause of it. In the second book of WWR I, Schopenhauer foresha-
dows a more detailed discussion of the role of cognition in the following way:
Originally in the service of the will and determined by the accomplishment of its
aim, cognition remains almost entirely in its service throughout: this is the case
in all animals and in almost all human beings. Nonetheless, in the Third Book we
will see how in certain people knowledge evades this servitude, throws o! its
yoke and can exist free from any purposes of the will and purely for itself,
simply as a clear mirror of the world; and this is the origin of art. Finally, in
the Fourth Book we will see how this sort of cognition, acting back on the will,
can bring about the will’s self-abolition, i.e. the resignation that is the "nal goal,
indeed the innermost essence of all virtue and holiness and is redemption
from the world.
(WWR I, §27, 177; emphasis added)
The thought here is that cognition is the only thing that could have in#uence on
the will. When we attain a su$cient degree of insight into the essence of the
world, the will which is objecti"ed in the individual catches a glimpse of itself,
as it were. It sees the inevitability of su!ering, the futility of striving, and the role
of willing in it. It is in such circumstances that the will seeks to abolish itself and
the individual develops a desire to be free from ordinary individualistic desires.
The third feature we need to examine is the nature of willing that is at work
in the negation of the will. Janaway (“What’s So Good”) o!ers the most sys-
tematic treatment of this issue in the contemporary literature and the
ensuing discussion follows his lead.
10Schopenhauer’s view thus bears close resemblance to the Molinist view that human cooperation is the
condition of the possibility of divine grace. For a helpful overview of the latter topic, see Freddoso,
“Introduction”.
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The central idea is that there are two kinds of willing in operation in Scho-
penhauer’s system. On the one hand, there is the kind of individualistic willing
that is subject to the will to life. It is aimed at the well-being of the individual
and the preservation of the species. This is what Schopenhauer calls the
a$rmation of the will. On the other hand, there is the kind of willing which
is made possible by the recognition of the essence of the world. It aims at
the state of will-lessness in which one is free of the individualistic desires of
the "rst kind.
In addition to the previously cited passages, it is worth considering in
this context Schopenhauer’s remarks about the e!ects of tragedy on
the spectator:
The horrors on the stage hold up to him the bitterness and worthlessness of life,
and so the vanity of all its e!orts and endeavours. The e!ect of this impression
must be that he becomes aware, although only in an obscure feeling, that it is
better to tear his heart away from life, to turn his willing away from it, not to love
the world and life. Thus in depth of his being the consciousness is then stirred
that for a di"erent kind of willing there must be a di!erent kind of existence also.
(WWR II, Ch. 37, 435; emphasis added)
Moreover, in the fourth book of WWR I, Schopenhauer makes a reference to
“striving that tends in a direction diametrically opposed to that of happiness,
i.e. of well-being and life” (WWR I, §65, 388).
These excerpts provide considerable evidence for the claim that Schopen-
hauer in fact recognized two kinds of desiring and willing.
This distinction between two kinds of willing helps us make sense of how
salvation in the state of will-lessness can be ‘good’ or ‘desirable’ at all. After all,
Schopenhauer writes early on in the fourth book of WWR I that:
anything that is agreeable to the will in any of its expressions, that is conducive
to its purposes, is intended in the concept of good.
(WWR I, §65, 387)
If something is good just in case it is conducive to the purpose of willing, then
the claim that the state of will-lessness is good for an individual might appear
paradoxical. Schopenhauer seems aware of this as he writes:
Absolute good is thus a contradiction: highest good or summum bonum mean
the same thing, denoting properly an ultimate satisfaction for the will, following
which there will be no new willing, an ultimate motive whose accomplishment
will give lasting satisfaction to the will.
(WWR I, §65, 389)
However, having claimed that there is no absolute good per se, he elaborates
that we might "guratively use this notion to refer to the state of will-lessness:
But…we might "guratively call the complete self-abolition and negation of the
will, the true absence of will, the only thing that can staunch and appease the
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impulses of the will forever, the only thing that can give everlasting content-
ment, the only thing that can redeem the world… the summum bonum.
(WWR I, §65, 389)
The way to make sense of these seemingly divergent claims is to recognize
that, just like there are two kinds of willing in operation, there are two
kinds of goodness. Most things are good in virtue of satisfying individualistic
desires. By contrast, salvation in the state of will-lessness is good in virtue of
satisfying a di!erent kind of desire or willing: the desire to be free from indi-
vidualistic desires.
This does not address Hamlyn’s challenge yet. For one must show not
only that salvation is good, but also that it is better than the outcome of
death or suicide. After all, they are also characterized by the absence of indi-
vidualistic desires.
If Schopenhauer is to be redeemed here, there must be more to the state of
will-lessness than the name suggests. And, indeed, Schopenhauer claims that
there is more to it than the mere absence of individualistic desires. Speaking
about the summum bonum in the passage cited above, Schopenhauer writes
that the state of will-lessness is characterized by ‘everlasting contentment’.
Moreover, further in the same section, he suggests that through the negation
of the will:
A human being achieves the state of voluntary renunciation, resignation, true
composure, and complete will-lessness.
(WWR I, §68, 406; emphasis added)
Finally, he talks about “peace and blissfulness” (WWR I, §68, 418) and “ecstasy”
(WWR I, §68, 438) when characterizing the psychological state of people who
achieved the perfect negation of the will. This suggests that Schopenhauer
understands the state of will-lessness as involving a special kind of experien-
tial state which is related to, but distinct from, the mere absence of individua-
listic desires.
Thus, there is a substantial di!erence between merely satisfying a desire to
be rid of individualistic desiring (which can be achieved through death and
suicide) and satisfying a desire to experience the peace and contentment of
having no individualistic desires. To put it in Wittgensteinian terms, if you
deduct one from another, you are left with the experiential state of will-less-
ness. It is in virtue of that state that Schopenhauerian salvation is better
than death.
At this point, one could worry that there is another tension here. If what an
ascetic truly desires is the experience of having no individualistic desires, how
could they be indi!erent between life and death? Clearly, there is no prospect
of such experience after death. Consequently, it seems that someone in the
state of will-lessness would have a reason to postpone death as long as poss-
ible in order to continue enjoying this experience.
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Schopenhauer seems to have a solution to this puzzle, too. He appears to
construe the state of will-lessness as experienced in a timeless way. For
instance, he writes:
If we have recognized all this, we will certainly not evade the consequence that
along with the free negation, the abandonment, of the will, all those appearances
are also abolished, those constant urges and drives that have no goal or pause,
that operate on all levels of objecthood in which and through which the world
exists, the manifold forms that follow each other in succession, the will’s whole
appearance and ultimately its universal forms as well, time and space, and its
"nal fundamental form, subject and object.
(WWR I, §70, 438; emphasis added)
Consequently, a longer experience of being free from individualistic desires
would not be preferable to a shorter one, other things being equal. But it
would presumably be better for a person to enter the state of will-lessness
earlier rather than later in their life, so that they endure less su!ering.
10. Concluding remarks
The "rst part of this paper developed a reading of Schopenhauer’s argument
against suicide. Section 3 argued that his objection is that suicide prevents
one from attaining salvation in the state of will-lessness which is better
than the outcome of suicide. Section 4 pointed out that the connection
between this argument and Schopenhauer’s critiques of stoicism provides
further support for the accuracy of this interpretation. Section 5 then
suggested that what makes death by voluntary starvation admirable is that
it occurs in the state of will-lessness and that it is not fact a kind of suicide.
The second part of the paper argued that the apparent inconsistencies put
forward by Jacquette, Shapshay, and Hamlyn can be resolved without any con-
cessions on Schopenhauer’s part. We saw that his argument applies equally to
philosophically enlightened suicide which would also prevent one from attain-
ing salvation. We further saw that the tension between the ideals of compassion
and resignation is only apparent. Although compassionate action aims to alle-
viate others’ su!ering, it is largely inconsequential in this respect, and so does
not prevent them from attaining salvation. Thus, it is not objectionable on the
same grounds as suicide. And, short of going against the injunction to help
others, ascetic resignation is the most signi"cant way of complying with it.
Finally, we saw that salvation in the state of will-lessness is superior to the
outcome of death because it involves an experiential state of peace and con-
tentment associated with having no individualistic desires.
That said, one di$culty in reconstructing Schopenhauer’s thought is that it
often seems that as we clog up one purported hole in his system, other holes
begin to surface. It is thus worth closing with two issues which are worthy of
attention in future scholarship.
BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 21
The "rst is this. Schopenhauer frequently remarks that non-existence
would be superior to existence. For instance:
The essential content of the world-famous monologue in Hamlet is, if summar-
ized: our condition is so miserable that complete non-being would be decidedly
preferable.
(WWR I, §59, 351)
Thus, his view appears to be that (i) never having been born is preferable to (ii)
existing and attaining the state of will-lessness, which is preferable to (iii)
existing and dying (e.g. by suicide) without attaining salvation. There is no
logical inconsistency here. However, as soon as we recognize that the state
of will-lessness is genuinely positive in virtue of that experiential state of
peace and contentment associated with having no individualistic, we may
be inclined to conclude that the entire life in which that state is attained is gen-
uinely good as well. And this puts some pressure on the justi"ability of the
claim that non-existence would be better than this kind of life.
The second issue is that Schopenhauer’s account of salvation may strike us
as disappointingly individualistic. So what, we might ask, that this or that indi-
vidual attained the state of will-lessness? In the grand scheme of things, that’s
a mere spark of light in the never-ending night of su!ering. Indeed, we might
probe further, how could something be genuinely good for an individual? The
boundaries between di!erent people were supposed to be an illusion, made
possible the failure to see through the principium individuationis.
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